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Translation as a Form of Dispossession 
In the last decade, changing juridical frameworks regarding sexual and gender diversity have played 
a central role in the development of human rights and government planning on an international 
scale. A series of initiatives exemplifies this recent shift: from the Yogyakarta Principles developed 
in 2006, to the presentation of the 2008 UN General Assembly Statement (signed by 66 countries) 
that “Affirms Rights for All”; from the creation of the Human Rights Council in 2006 and the 
prominence it has since given to Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) rights, to the 
United Nations “Human Rights, sexual orientation and gender identity” Resolution of 2011, and the 
subsequent “Free & Equal Campaign for LGBT equality” launched by the UN Human Rights Office in 
2013. All of these manifest an increasing preoccupation with the expansion of key liberties. At the 
same time, we can see clear evidence of how gender theory as well as the claims of feminist and 
LGTBI social movements have been incorporated into public administrations and their new legal 
policies. 
A growing popular consensus about the desirability of incorporating gender and sexual equity into 
the law, and of offering recognition for other ways of living gender and sexuality more in keeping 
with the reality of people’s lives and views today, has been making itself felt across different 
contexts. In the EU, for instance, this has been one of the most significant debates over the last 
decade, leading to the design of new programmes aimed at the recognition of sexual diversity, with 
recommendations and goals for national governments to foster the achievement of ideals of equity 
and non-discrimination.[1] In light of these new programs, gendered and sexual “others” have been 
“included” in the parameters of human rights, leading to increasing pressure to reformulate 
citizenship rights and to the development of what has been called “sexual citizenship.”[2] 
In this context, the universalist humanist vision of UN and EU policies and politics regarding the 
recognition of gender and sexual diversity has become the leading trend and the framework within 
which every project concerned with these matters will arguably have to define its own terms. This 
new politics of gender and sexuality has clearly been shaped by the parameters established by 
Euro-North Atlantic paradigms, following the models of so-called advanced late-modern 
democracies. The question arises then as to whether (or how) the principles of the democratisation 
of gender and sexuality have assumed orientalist and colonial forms. As Eric Fassin, among many 
others, has pointed out, “sexual democracy” today has become a synonym for secularity, modernity 
and democratic values,[3] and this has happened in such a way that the borders of an imagined late-
modern and democratic West are being defined in renewed sexual terms, against a multiplicity of 
others who are marked by cultural, religious and racialised differences.[4] 
As has been amply documented, the internationalisation of sexual politics within universalist 
frameworks has raised the question of cultural differences and the problem of cultural translation 
in renewed ways. It is in this context that I aim to discuss the political implications of addressing 
the struggle for sexual freedom and justice in terms of sexual citizenship—a construct produced by 
the hegemonic frameworks defined by the European Union, the United Nations, and international 
human rights organisations. I begin by outlining the difficulty that cultural translation poses for 
thinking about the universalisation of sexual identities and the translation of sexuality into a 
specific set of rights. What happens to both subjectivity and sexuality when Western hegemonic 
models of sexual human rights are rendered as universal principles for making sexual rights claims? 
In particular, how does this process over-determine the way in which sexual self-determination is 
considered across cultural differences? Following on from this, I analyse the process by which 
subjectivity and sexuality are ontologically reconstituted, so that, regardless of any particular 
cultural background, sexuality becomes a possession that a liberal subject is said to have. Finally, I 
pose a set of questions with the aim of exploring the extent to and ways in which a dialogue 
between queer and decolonial perspectives may challenge the possessive liberal “citizen subject of 
sexual rights”, as well as the universalising and therefore exclusionary logic that characterises it. 
Cultural translations and sexual politics 
The initial impulse for this essay was a question that arose from an interest in the intricate 
problems posed by cultural translation vis-à-vis the fact that sexual human rights and concomitant 
citizenship paradigms over-determine the ways in which sexual self-determination can be 
considered across cultural differences. In effect, these paradigms have become the point of 
reference according to which any project concerned with sexual matters is deemed to define its 
terms—as being either more or less in line with those paradigms, or taking a more radical distance 
from them. It is from this point of departure that I would like to pose the question about the ways 
in which we could consider a dialogue between a queer approach and a critical perspective on 
global coloniality.[5] 
Notwithstanding critical reflection on translation as ultimately constitutive of any cultural 
identity,[6] when issues of cultural translation arise, they are usually addressed as a problem 
between two fixed points. Although it is accepted that these two points may be in a process of 
constant transformation within a translation process, they are still imagined as identifiable. This 
identification works either in terms of a “before and after” in the process of translation, or 
spatially, with relatively fixed points of origin and destination marking the trajectory of the 
translation process itself. From this point of view, translation can only be conceived precisely 
as trans-lation, given that the identity of the terms involved (cultures, imaginaries, social 
discourses, concepts, etc.) are taken as belonging to autonomous and more or less stable parties. 
Translation as a process of displacement and change requires the origin and the destination, as well 
as the travelling imaginary, to be fixed entities with identifiable contours. 
But what happens when translation is embodied in such a way that the borders between origin, 
destination, and that which is to be translated (or has already been translated) are blurred? What 
happens when “the voice” is in a constant process of translation, so that translation becomes 
indistinguishable from the identity of this voice? Translation as a constant transformation, pointing 
towards the instability of signifiers and the confusion of terms, is associated with hybridisation, 
impurity, a form of indeterminacy that defies any claim to authenticity. That experience of 
translation is not always a comfortable or happy one; more often, it is embodied as frustration, 
fear, conflict, ignorance, alienation, and even bad conscience. Which allegiances should one 
choose? Which knowledge traditions should one betray? This is not an easy place to inhabit, nor is it 
always necessarily the consciousness of a hybridised “new mestiza” dwelling in the borderlands, as 
Gloria Anzaldúa would put it, that is achieved.[7] 
The tension between purity and impurity is of primary importance in debates over universalising 
frameworks for sexual rights. As Butler indicates, when the universalisation and internationalisation 
of certain terms are at play, we cannot refer to “one culture which defines itself over and against 
another.”[8] This is not just because translation is constitutive of these cultures, but also because, 
as Butler points out, “the very concept of universality compels an understanding of culture as a 
relation of exchange and task of translation.”[9] In fact, “the problem of cross-cultural translation 
that the concept of universality has become,” is directly implicated in the question of the 
hegemony of certain languages over others.[10]Hegemony, by definition, renders any ultimate 
realisation of universality impossible.[11]Universality, then, can only appear as an unreachable 
horizon, where an ideal, unattainable translation takes form. As translation is always already 
marked by hegemonic relations, the point would be to try to understand the formation of these 
hegemonies. So, when sexual rights are claimed, the question to ask ourselves is: what is being 
translated and how does this translation work (if it does), when the sexual identities that go with 
these rights are universalised as well? 
Within the tension between the constitutive hybridity of sexual subjectivities, and the hegemonies 
involved in the universalisation of sexual identities, who has access to make demands in the name 
of sexual rights? Arguably, the sexual rights-bearing subject points to a specifically sexual form of 
hegemony that takes place through the elaboration of sexual subjectivities. If we claim that the 
new politics of gender and sexuality is framed by parameters established by so-called advanced 
late-modern democracies, we can explore how different versions of this same account work. 
Rather than honouring the politics of translation, the ways in which sexual democratisation has 
been functioning indicate a process of othering. On the one hand, the political drive for equality 
has been encouraged on international and regional scales, including a wide range of non-
governmental organisations offering support and resources to activists in postcolonial local 
contexts. Such is the case of the International Gay & Lesbian Human Rights Commission (IGLHRC), 
or the International Lesbian and Gay Association (ILGA). Regardless of their intentions, these 
initiatives tend to work as a regulative force, establishing the terms in which sexual demands can 
be made, and even leading to paternalist logics.[12] On the other, the sexual democratic turn that 
seems to define the boundaries of “the free Occident” has turned out to be a crucial rhetorical 
element in the implementation of neo-colonial projects and the resurgence of Islamophobia. As has 
been amply documented, the rescue narrative concerning “Muslim women,” and later LGBT people 
in Muslim-majority countries, in the aftermath of the so-called War on Terror, was extensively 
mobilised to justify the military interventions.[13] In the European Union, particularly in the cases of 
the UK, Germany, France, and the Netherlands, sexual progressive rhetoric has been used to justify 
anti-immigration policies and the segregation of postcolonial populations within Europe, portraying 
them as intrinsically antidemocratic and backward.[14] 
This brief panorama indicates how coloniality and orientalist mentalities have influenced the 
shaping of the emergent “sexual rights-bearing subject,” not only at the level of political rhetoric 
but also in terms of the kind of politics that is generated in the name of this subject. In the first 
place, the respectable, democratic subject capable of acknowledging sexual diversity appears as a 
particular “self” that is constituted against a multiplicity of others who are marked by cultural, 
religious and racialised differences. Secondly, either in benevolent and patronising ways, or in a 
more overtly imperialist fashion, the (occidental) sexual citizen and bearer of rights becomes the 
benchmark against which all other sexual subjects must be measured. For this benchmark to work, 
an orientalist narrative of progress must be constructed, and with it specific notions and 
trajectories of gender and sexual ways of being, such as Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual and Transgender, 
become naturalised: the benchmark represents the historical present to which “all the others” 
should aspire and which, sooner or later, they should reach. 
It is in this context that sexual rights have widely come to be understood as a step forward in the 
progression towards democracy.[15] This is especially clear when we consider that the very signs of 
“advanced” modernity and “abstract” citizenship shape dominant modes of sexual freedom. But 
what role has the language of rights played in the constitution of gender and sexual identities and 
in crystallising their constitution as political subjects? What is the narrative structure of this 
account of “advanced” development? What are its flaws and constitutive exclusions? In my view, 
many of the limitations of the juridification of gender and sexual freedom and justice claims arise 
precisely when this process is configured within the liberal-democratic model in which the subject 
of sexual rights corresponds to the abstract individual of liberalism. As long as sexual rights are 
conceived under the canons of liberal democracy, they remain subjected to a neo-colonialist and 
restrictive conception of citizenship, democracy and politics. This both determines and limits what 
can be understood as democratic. Indeed, the fact that liberal-democratic agencies have set the 
agenda of sexual democratisation implies that, to be perceived as democratic, governments and 
progressive sexual movements are forced to adhere to the liberal model. 
I have argued elsewhere that to criticise the democratic sexual turn for its racist uses or for its use 
as a mechanism for (racialised) cultural segregation would be to highlight only part of the 
problem.[16] The democratisation of sexuality (identity politics, politics of inclusion, rights-based 
discourse) is already imbued with Eurocentric assumptions which, in my view, impose the 
restrictions of political liberalism and of the liberal subject it presupposes. As long as it is through 
political liberalism that the sexual subject of rights is articulated, sexual democracy will remain 
liberal democracy. Therefore, if political liberalism is the form in which the colonial and orientalist 
views implicated in sexualised figurations and norms have been articulated, it would be neither 
sufficient nor accurate exclusively to address the racialisation of sexual democracy as if 
racialisation and liberal sexual democratisation were external to one another. I would argue instead 
that sexual democracy is itself inseparable from orientalist/colonial formations. This second 
understanding offers a different account of why and how sexual democracy has become the 
signifier of modernity, secularism, and democratic values. It demands that we look into the modern 
and then late-modern relationship between sexuality, subjectivity and citizenship that is 
presupposed by the figure of the sexual citizen shaped by liberal Euro-North American democratic 
ideals. In other words, we should explore the hegemonic contemporary understanding of what 
sexuality and subjectivity “are,” or should be, in order to be naturally assumed as part of 
citizenship. 
At this point it might be useful to make an analytical distinction between politics and 
epistemologies, although both dimensions are logically articulated. In other words, to analyse the 
implications of this sexual democratic turn, we may need to differentiate between, on the one 
hand, the problem of how sexual politics are enacted locally and globally, and, on the other, the 
underlying question concerning the onto-epistemological sexual categories that are put into play 
through those politics. Joseph Massad has analysed this matter in detail inDesiring Arabs.[17] In that 
book, Massad develops the notion of “sexual epistemology” to describe those ideas and frameworks 
that emerged in modern Europe and made of sexuality (and all its derivatives: homosexuality, 
bisexuality, heterosexuality) an ontological category. According to Massad, it is this sexual 
epistemology that is at the basis of current global and mainstream sexual politics, which are 
operating under the assumption that “being gay” is a universal (and even trans-historical) 
experience. Although within academic circles it is widely accepted that homosexuality is indebted 
to the modern Western tradition—as Foucault’s seminal History of Sexuality highlighted—[18] the 
widespread assumption is that there is an ontology of being sexual (whether hetero or homo, and to 
a much lesser extent bisexual), so that certain experiences and ideas about sexuality become 
naturalised. The orientalist progressive narrative, according to which the Western model of “the 
sexual rights bearing subject” becomes a benchmark, requires this in order to ensure its continuity. 
In the following section, I further analyse some of the characteristics of this sexual epistemology, 
while arguing that the conditions of intelligibility of sexual rights depend on a possessive modality 
that defines sexual orientation and identity together with the political subject of rights. 
From sexual identities to the sexual field 
The epistemological move whereby sexuality becomes the ontological foundation of every subject is 
at the basis of the notion of sexual rights and the humanist perspective that sustains it. This 
perspective necessarily forgets that sexuality is a device that came into being in the European 
nineteenth century as a mechanism for the standardisation of modern Western bourgeois sexual 
behaviours.[19] This device is a racialised construct with a colonial legacy, which also depends on 
class markers.[20] Nonetheless, within this sexual epistemology, a particular historical and cultural 
trajectory for experiencing, imagining, and understanding sexuality is universalised and 
subsequently understood as the point of reference with respect to which any experience associated 
with the sexual is to be judged. As for how this sexual epistemology impacts on notions of sexual 
orientation and identity, we can consider for instance how the formula “LGBT” functions as a 
universal descriptor in manifold reports, declarations, and campaigns organised by international 
organisations. These uses reinforce the oblivion of the historical character of the notion of 
sexuality. Further, they indicate how this sexual epistemology limits the scope of the claims related 
to sexual justice and freedom, requiring any rights claim to be framed within the terms of these 
onto-epistemological categories in order to become legible. 
Yet the problem is even more complicated, because the search for more inclusive categories able 
to register the different ways of being gay, lesbian, bisexual or trans does not necessarily avoid the 
risk of reproducing this sexual epistemology.[21] That is what happens when, in the attempt to 
dismantle the universal idea of what it means to be gay, this deconstructive gesture is 
provincialised as a particular case which confirms the universality of homosexuality, as a framework 
configured through ideas of sexual orientation and identity. Consider the fate of the MSM (men who 
have sex with men) category. As Massad points out, this category—which originated precisely to 
distinguish a culturally inflected socio-sexual practice from the universalist paradigm of 
homosexuality—has been reinscribed into the logic of sexual orientation, converted into another 
sexual-identity category to be added to the list of non-normative sexual identities that oppose the 
norm of heterosexuality.[22] 
Along these lines, Greg Thomas criticises hegemonic Western contemporary academia for not being 
able to address the whiteness embedded in the onto-epistemology of sexuality itself. Thomas 
states: 
as neo-colonialism and imperialism are replaced by the language of multiculturalism and the rather 
liberal rhetoric of “race, gender, class and sexuality,” contemporary academia does not confront 
but rather consolidates the Occidentalism that universalizes sexuality both at the level of politics 
and epistemology.[23] 
According to the author, the problem with these frameworks is that they circumscribe their inquiry 
to the question of how this or that sexual identity might be racialised, while remaining unable to 
grasp the fact that what is understood as sexual in such a proposition is, at an epistemological 
level, already racialised. In Thomas’s view, “when sexuality is said to be a social construction in 
academia, the social constructions of Western empire are sanctified above all.” This is because, 
the author continues, it would be precisely through such a deconstructive move that Western 
“erotic schemes are naturalized by theories of denaturalization.”[24] Thomas is pointing to the need 
to question the fundamental categories that ground this sexual epistemology. But how can one 
deconstruct the universalism of LGBT identitarian schemes without reinforcing the sexual 
epistemology that one is trying to dismantle? Here we are again confronted with the tension posed 
by hegemony and power differentials concerning the conditions that enable the production and 
translation of knowledge. 
“We” might have witnessed this tension in international conferences and forums where these issues 
are at stake.[25] “We” might have seen how different analyses of, for example, locas, hijras, 
travestis or two-spirit people, which challenge this Western sexual onto-epistemology, tend to be 
re-interpreted according to the grammars and standards of mainly Anglo-North American 
traditions.[26] It is frustrating that cultural translation works mainly in a one-way direction, reducing 
such interventions to case studies which, under hegemonic eyes, supposedly limit themselves to 
bringing forward other gender and sexual identities, and therefore amount to the expansion of a 
universal that now includes more categories within it. Such interventions are also “minoritised” 
within the hegemonic understandings of sexuality in academic circles. It is important to insist that 
the critical analysis of this sexual epistemology requires us to distinguish between onto-
epistemological categories of identity and the sexual field within which these categories make 
sense—in other words, the conditions of intelligibility that make such forms of identification 
possible in the first place.  On the one hand, we are confronted with the tensions among different 
identity categories, or systems of identification and classification that refer to certain sexual 
orientations and sexual “types.” On the other, we have categories that describe a sexual field or 
domain, referring to the semantic fields that configure these subject formations—in other words, 
axes of interpretation that shape and give meaning to the fields in which these particular identities 
become thinkable: namely, sexuality, citizenship, politics. Only by focusing the critique on the 
conditions of intelligibility that allow for the emergence of the axes that define these identities, 
and by further linking “the sexual” to identity as a whole, would it be possible to challenge the 
limited Western paradigm of sexual rights. And yet if we take into account how translation works, 
even this might not be enough. What are the pervasive elements of this sexual field under which 
any person can become intelligible as a sexual subject, as much as a political subject? Is it not the 
case that academic hegemony somehow reconfirms the sexual subject as a political subject only if 
the sexual field is understood in a certain way? 
When considering the central role played by sexual identity in contemporary sexual rights-claims, 
Foucault’s analysis of how sexual practices were reinterpreted as the signs of new sexual species 
continues to be relevant. As mentioned earlier, this transformation by which sexual practices were 
refashioned as the features of sexual “types” took place under the guise of liberalism, describing a 
new relation of the “I” with itself. This relation was based on an inward self-reflective movement, 
by which the “I” became an autonomous subject in search of the realisation of the freedom of its 
self.[27] Now, this movement that gave rise to the liberal subject is similarly indebted to possessive 
individualism, and the subsequent model of self-ownership.[28] Embedded in this tradition, the 
Western paradigm of individual sexual rights based on sexual orientation and identity relies to a 
great extent on self-owned subjects whose relationship to their bodies, desires and sexuality 
becomes one of ownership.[29] The passage from sexual practices to sexual types or species 
described by Foucault forms the basis for the current struggles for recognition of the sexual rights-
bearing subject, wherein bodies and sexual desires, considered as possessions, become both an 
object of knowledge and a means of self-knowledge. This dynamic demarcates the battleground of 
the struggle between liberation and control. In effect, the counterpart of this sexual epistemology, 
which reframes sexuality as a possession, is the abstract sovereign subject defined by possessive 
individualism and transparent reason. Despite the long deconstructive tradition that has already 
killed the humanist subject a thousand times, and despite the post-identitarian mode of much 
current scholarship, it is still this sovereign self-owned subject—in possession of a sexuality that is 
potentially transparent to itself—who is at the base of the universalising impulse of sexual 
citizenship. 
The pervasive notion of transparency that survives any post-essentialist and critical claim is here 
key. Within the paradigm of transparency, freedom (and for that matter sexual rights, which imply 
being able to exercise self-determined control over our bodies and desires) would be achievable 
through the acquisition of knowledge and self-knowledge still shaped by claims to truth: it would 
be through knowledge that we would be able to make an informed decision, or liberate ourselves 
from social constraints that are not immediately evident to us.[30] The idea that freedom (either 
enacted in the form of autonomy of judgement, self-determination or choice) would be achievable 
through knowledge has been criticised by, among others, Denise Ferreira da Silva, who points out 
that transparency has become consolidated as “the attribute man has enjoyed since his institution 
as the sole self-determined being.”[31] Here, becoming the object of one’s own self-knowledge—the 
kernel of the sexual dispositif—points to a broader scheme where autonomy is entirely dependent 
on a reasoned quest for truth. Ferreira da Silva sustains that transparency depends on reason 
because reason was transformed into “the sole determinant of truth and freedom,” and both 
transparency and reason institute a subject within a racist logic. According to the author, “the 
philosophical statements that transformed reason … into sovereign ruler of science and history … 
situated this process entirely within the spatial and temporal borders of post-Enlightenment 
Europe.”[32] Hence, the argument continues, as long as the ontological presuppositions of the 
(modern) subject remain unquestioned, the structuring character of racial difference for conceiving 
modernity is obscured. That is why “the racial subaltern is always already inscribed as a historical 
subject who eventually comes into representation as a transparent ‘I’ when articulating an 
emancipatory project.”[33] 
Brenna Bhandar also highlights the flaws of those subaltern emancipatory projects, above all 
perhaps the struggle for recognition, which rely on the sovereign self-owned subject for their 
articulation.[34] She argues that the ontological conditions of such a subject of recognition are 
ultimately ones of destitution, and cannot be contemplated outside colonial relations of property. 
To the extent that it is on the basis of this self-owned subjectivity that current configurations of 
sexual rights are taken for granted, subsequent struggles for recognition need to be reviewed and 
rearticulated, if one is to challenge such an exclusionary version of sovereignty. But, how can we 
alter, modify, or re-articulate in a critical manner these fundamental epistemological categories 
that revolve around the logic of possession and control? To tackle this problem, in what follows I 
consider the possibilities of adopting a queer perspective in conjunction with a decolonial vision for 
challenging these hegemonic and exclusionary frameworks. 
Queer dialogues, decolonising moves  
To what extent does the queer commitment to denaturalising sexual identities and norms challenge 
the possessive account of sexual justice and freedom? To what extent could a queer perspective, in 
dialogue with a decolonial approach, expand the signifiers of sexuality beyond Western hegemonies 
and toward more democratic transnational solidarities? 
The so-called decolonial turn constituted a key epistemological intervention, highlighting the 
dynamics of global capitalism and obliging us to look anew at the “epistemology of the West” from 
the point of view of subalternised knowledge traditions.[35] Initially, the canonical representatives 
of decolonial traditions criticised postcolonial studies for their alleged “culturalism” and for acting 
in concert with a complacent poststructuralist paradigm. However, the positions have softened 
over time, and in fact, both approaches share a central interest in the overlap between culture, 
politics and global capitalism.[36] But there is another criticism that some contemporary decolonial 
scholars such as Walter Mignolo or Ramón Grosfoguel have made of postcolonial studies, which still 
stands today.[37] According to these authors, postcolonial studies cannot offer a radical critique of 
the implications of colonialism as they are part of the poststructuralist or postmodern turn and, 
therefore, are understood as part of the dominant Western paradigm of the moment. This 
decolonial view is controversial. It surreptitiously advocates a position of exteriority from which to 
offer a radical and absolute counter-discourse to Western modernity, and therefore reinforces the 
idea that there is an ontological difference between Western modernity and its other. In more or 
less implicit terms, such a decolonial position reinforces untenable ideas of cultural purity.[38] 
However, this brief sketch of the contemporary decolonial vision does not account for the influence 
of Chicana feminist theory in the development of a decolonial perspective which would, in fact, 
also link up with feminist and queer traditions.[39] From this latter perspective, it is, above all, 
impurity and a permanent state of translation that define the decolonial approach. 
Anzaldúa’s mestiza is also a queer figure destined to defy binaries and preconceived systems of 
categorisation. Along these lines, María Lugones also points to the double or fractured 
consciousness of the colonised subject.[40] In part imbued by this tradition of “border thinking,” at 
the intersection of race, culture and sexuality, a strand of “queer of colour” theory has emerged, 
challenging the hegemonic queer tradition and its indifference to the postcolonial condition and 
the racialised dimension of queer configurations, including a specific Latino tradition of queer 
studies.[41] It is within these entangled genealogies, then, that one should contextualise the 
question concerning the kind of critique that a queer perspective might offer to the sexual 
epistemology described in the previous sections. Such a practice of “border thinking” toward a 
decolonial vision is exemplarily put forward by Scott Morgensen in Spaces Between Us. In this book, 
Morgensen accounts for how Native queer and Two-Spirit activists “uniquely contest the 
naturalisation of settler colonialism, the very formation homonationalism 
reinforces.”[42] Morgensen’s analysis contests hegemonic frameworks of sexual inclusion as they 
depend on categories and modes of differential subjectivation proper to settler colonialism, that is 
to say modes of subjecthood which in such settler colonial contexts are already dependent on the 
material and symbolic dispossession of Native peoples. 
This understanding of dispossession points to both the material dispossession of lands and 
resources, and the entangled dispossession implied by not being acknowledged as a “proper 
subject,” which forms the back and foil of the coloniser’s appropriative activity.[43] The “proper 
subject” who is tied to sexual universalist identities is also tied to this two-fold modality of 
dispossession, to which Athena Athanasiou and Judith Butler also refer.[44] In this regard, Alyosha 
Goldstein shows how the differential subjectivation by which settler colonialism is justified and 
continues to be mobilised corresponds to forms of “propriation” directly linked to the opposition 
between the (white) capacity to possess and the incapacity to possess attributed to the colonised 
subject.[45] 
This possessive modality, which directs us back to the foundational entanglement between 
possessive individualism and the colonial enterprise, linking identity and property, as Bhandar 
points out, [46] is at the core of the sexual rights-bearing subject and the concomitant hegemonic 
understanding of sexual identities I have been discussing in previous sections. In this sense, the 
possibility of a productive critical dialogue between queer and decolonial perspectives 
fundamentally involves, in my view, an understanding of “the queer” as a modality of being and as 
a mode of knowledge that disrupts the exclusionary borders connoted by the legislation of 
categories. 
Understood in these terms, a queer critique may aim to ally itself not just with those who occupy 
the place of the segregated, the marginalised, and the excluded, but first and foremost with those 
radically antagonistic instances that signal a social vacuum where any society draws the radical 
boundary to give a totalising and conclusive account of itself.[47] In other words, the queer may be 
identified in this sense as the locus of a key fissure wherein the recognition of a certain subject 
position demands the undoing of the available schemes of intelligibility that organise the system of 
identities as a whole. Of course, there are no straightforward or easy answers here. I would simply 
limit myself to a parallel between the queer commitment to challenging the epistemic limits, which 
I am proposing here, and the form of recognition advanced by Butler, who considers it as a form of 
translation in which, in a very queer fashion, one would be able to be undone, or to be dispossessed 
from what one knows. As Butler writes: 
One can give and take recognition only on the condition that one becomes disoriented from 
oneself, that one undergoes a “de-centering” and fails to achieve self-identity. … This version of 
recognition will be based less on knowledge than on apprehension of epistemic limits.[48] 
A queer critique of those sexual epistemologies that become universalised through one-way 
processes of cultural translation also takes us back to the idea of queerness as that which 
dismantles preconceived notions of the self and the social. I think the queer offers possibilities for 
disputing the epistemological assumptions of sexuality; this heavily loaded term, when we think 
about it as a figuration for this “constitutive outside,” is understood in Laclau’s terms as an 
antagonistic site that precisely marks the operative exclusions that allow the social (or the self) to 
imagine itself as a knowable whole. In pursuit of a permanent questioning of the epistemic limits of 
the paradigms within which we operate, a queer perspective might be inviting us to an ongoing 
process of cultural translation that could really be open and genuine. This openness might be 
associated with a radical productive negativity,[49] which, rather than posing a demand for 
inclusion, asks to revise, for instance, what is understood as properly sexual. 
An example of such a challenge could be found on a contemporary political level in the Ecuadorian 
Constitution, which reconceived gender identity as an aesthetic liberty. One of the leading 
members of the activist collective Proyecto Transgénero, whose interventions are based on 
alternative uses of law, promoted the introduction of “Aesthetic Freedom” in the Ecuadorian 
Constitution of 2008. This move opened the path to further claims regarding gender justice and 
antidiscrimination legislation, including but not limited to preconceived ideas of gender 
expression.[50] Far from being exclusively proper to “peripheral” sites, one may also find evocations 
of this opening gesture that troubles the self-owned “sexual I” at the centre of recent and less 
recent Western traditions of knowledge and politics. Such is the case of Monique Wittig’s lesbian 
embodiments, which challenge the unity of the sexual body.[51] The fragmented body of Monique 
Wittig, in effect, is the locus where the J/e finds itself traversed by a bar. Wittig states that this 
bar “helps to imagine an excess of the ‘I’… where this I and this You are interchangeable.” Both 
self-ownership and the unity of the sexual body are, after all, undone when flooded by passion. The 
sexual epistemology implied by the sexual rights-bearing subject cannot in fact contain this 
passion, nor can it capture this passionate self, whose sexual experience is set at a distance from 
the sexuality that a self-owned subject is said to know and possess. 
Conclusions 
I began this essay by posing the problem of cultural translation in relation to sexual politics and 
cultural differences. In order to articulate the question concerning the possible modalities of a 
queer critical approach to the universalism of the “sexual rights-bearing subject”, I posed a series 
of enquiries that I consider important for situating the discussion. First, I analysed the implications 
of the juridification of sexual freedom and justice claims and principles, especially when they are 
understood almost exclusively in terms of liberal individual rights. I then discussed the 
colonial/orientalist vision that weighs on the sexual subject of rights and the subsequent 
internationalisation of the figure of sexual citizenship. My contention was that, to a great extent, 
the orientalist character of this figure is related to the fact that it has been configured under the 
canons of political liberalism, and concomitant liberal democratic ideals. 
Yet the liberal character of the sexual citizen is not restricted to the political ideals that this figure 
embodies, but instead implicates its onto-epistemological foundations. That is why I went on to 
argue for the need to revise these political categories on an epistemological level, showing that 
they were based on a specific Western modern tradition, which accounts for their exclusionary and 
racially-marked character. 
With the help of Massad, I contended that in order to be transmuted into a set of rights to which an 
abstract subject is entitled, sexuality remains tied to a sexual epistemology that turns it into a 
universal ontological reality based on naturalised notions of sexual orientation and identity. In this 
context, I proposed a distinction between identity categories and categories of field or domain, 
which would describe the conditions that shape this identitarian onto-epistemological framework. I 
argued that the sexual epistemology of the sexual rights bearing subject preconceives sexuality as a 
property that a self-owned subject is said to possess. This is a subject who will relate to its 
sexuality in a possessive modality, as the owner of its body and of the sexual properties that come 
with it. The possessive character of the relationship between subjectivity and sexuality is, in 
effect, indebted to the liberal subject who will be defined precisely as a subject insofar as it is in 
possession of its own being. It is through this possessive modality, as one of the conditions that 
make possible the emergence of sexual onto-epistemological categories of identity, that sexuality 
is translated into a right. 
In light of this account, I finally consider how a queer approach, inflected by a decolonial vision, 
might be able to challenge this possessive scheme of intelligibility by which one is at the same time 
dispossessed.[52] Here I contended that it would be through the disruption of this second type of 
categories—the categories of field or domain—that it becomes possible to question the possessive 
ontology of sexuality defined according to a Euro-North Atlantic horizon. It is by focusing on this 
second level that we may find the most productive challenges to the political ontology of the 
sexual subject proper to the tradition of political liberalism, and the presupposed universality of 
the categories of domain or field (the conditions of intelligibility) in which cultural and sexual 
diversity are recognised and included, or in sum accommodated. 
The problematisation of the field of intelligibility in which the norms of gender, sexuality, and 
citizenship make sense resonates with the queer commitment to deconstruct not only identities but 
the categories that define the field in which these identities are configured as such. Ultimately, I 
think this focus not only evokes one of the basic tenets of a queer perspective, understood as a 
critical methodology. This form of cultural translation, destined to mark the boundaries of 
an épistème, is also a call to resist hegemonic forms of categorisation—a call that could also carry 
the echoes of a decolonial view. 
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